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THE CONSTITUTION OF PATENT LAW:
THE COURT OF CUSTOMS AND
PATENT APPEALS AND THE SHAPE OF THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JURISPRUDENCE
Jeffrey A. Lefstin*
Recent critiques of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have
focused on the court's reluctance to embrace cohesive policy
approaches in its patent jurisprudence, particularly when it comes to
questions of patent scope. This Article suggests that the Federal
Circuit's tendency towards more formalistic decision making derives in
part from the jurisprudential heritage of one of its predecessor courts,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. The modern doctrines of
patent scope were shaped by the CCPA's decisions in the years
following the 1952 Patent Act, especially its decisions interpreting
§§ 103 and 112 of the Act. When the Federal Circuit adopted the
CCPA's precedent in its first decision, the CCPA's law displaced that
of other courts previously charged with administering aspects of the
patent system. However, the CCPA's patent decisions were uniquely
shaped by three imperatives peculiar to the court and its place in the
patent system: the nature of the court itself its need to exert and
legitimize its control over Patent Office decisions; and its exclusive
focus on patentability rather than patent enforcement. Though the
modern Federal Circuit has far different jurisprudential needs than did
the CCPA, the CCPA's legal methodologies are so deeply engrained in
patent law that they continue to shape Federal Circuit decision making
today. Those doctrines and methodologies may have served the CCPA
well; but they may not answer the needs of the modern patent system.
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THE CONSTITUTION OF PA TENT LAW
INTRODUCTION
In 1915, patent treatise-writer William Macomber published a
remarkable essay in the Yale Law Journal entitled Judicial
Discretion in Patent Causes.' His inspiration was the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit's ruling of non-infringement in the
famous Selden automobile patent litigation.2 Though Selden had
obtained a patent whose claims literally encompassed every practical
combination of the internal combustion engine and an automobile
chassis, in litigation against Ford Motor Company, the Second
Circuit confined Selden's claim to a "fair and reasonable" scope.'
Despite the lack of any limiting language in the claims, the Second
Circuit construed the claims to cover only automobiles employing
Selden's two-cycle constant pressure engine. Since nearly all
automobile manufacturers used the more modern four-cycle constant
volume engine, the Second Circuit's decision ended control of the
automobile industry by Selden's licensees.'
Macomber celebrated the Selden Case for the death of legal
formalism in patent law, and as a herald for a new era whose growth
in industrial progress and complexity demanded a concomitant
growth in judicial discretion to achieve policy goals.' In comparison,
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision fourteen years prior to uphold the
Bell Telephone Company's broad patent on the telephone6 seemed as
archaic a relic of "judicial literalism" as the Dred Scott Case' seemed
in Macomber's day:
However one may view the facts in these two cases, the
truth remains that the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Berliner Case could be repeated to-day no more than the
decision in the Dred Scott Case. No matter if the logic of
the Circuit Court of Appeals does appear strained in the
1. William Macomber, Judicial Discretion in Patent Causes, 24 YALE L.J. 99 (1915).
2. Columbia Motor Car Co. v. C. A. Duerr & Co. (Selden Case), 184 F. 893 (2d Cir. 1911).
3. Id. at 912.
4. JAMES J. FINK, THE AUTOMOBILE AGE 54-55 (1988).
5. Macomber, supra note 1, at 103.
6. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897).
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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light of the cases, it resulted in the exercise of judicial
discretion which was justice rather than academic law.
For Macomber, the Selden Case showed that judges had
transcended the old literalism of patent claim construction and were
adopting a new and pragmatic approach to patent law.9 This new
pragmatism demanded a creative judicial mind, with "the genius to
read an old statute in the light of new economic and industrial
condition," beyond the ordinary judicial function of choosing
between the arguments of two parties in a case."o For appellate judges
to exercise this power, their review had to extend to facts as well as
law, for otherwise excessive deference would ossify errors of the
trial court and interfere with the proper exercise of judicial
discretion.
An essay like Macomber's would not be written today. The
appellate court in control of modem patent law, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, is rarely praised for its flexibility or
for its exercise of judicial discretion in pursuit of policy goals. Far
more typical are criticisms like those of Professors Dan Burk and
Mark Lemley, who argue that today's patent law is sorely in need of
such policy discretion, and that the Federal Circuit has not been
exercising it, or at least not exercising it consciously and in an
organized fashion." Burk and Lemley describe the court as
"particularly resistant to considering patent policy in making its
decisions."l2 Other leading scholars reproach the Federal Circuit for
its embrace of "simple rules and formalism," for its excessive focus
on the facts of individual cases rather than policy issues, and for its
reluctance to sanction any doctrine not specifically grounded in the
text of the patent statutes."
My aim in this contribution to the symposium "The Federal
Circuit as an Institution" is not to assess whether the Federal Circuit
ought to be exercising more or less explicit policy discretion in
8. Macomber, supra note 1, at 101.
9. See id. at 103.
10. Id. at 104.
11. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,
1671-75 (2003) [hereinafter Policy Levers]; see also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE
PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009).
12. Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 11, at 1671.
13. See id. at 1671-75 (collecting criticisms).
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patent law today. It is instead to ask why the decision-making process
of the Federal Circuit does not function in the way that Macomber
celebrated or that Burk and Lemley urge. The answer I propose is
that the Federal Circuit's jurisprudential outlook derives in large part
not from its current circumstances, but instead from its ancestry.
The Federal Circuit was created from the merger of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and the appellate division of
the Court of Claims.14 In its first decision, South Corp. v. United
States," the new Federal Circuit adopted the caselaw of its
predecessor courts as controlling precedent.16 That choice seemed
unremarkable at the time. But by adopting the precedent of its
predecessor courts, the Federal Circuit adopted a body of patent law
that had been designed for use by a particular court, the CCPA, in a
particular context, the review of patentability decisions by the Patent
Office." That act of adoption at once set the contours of the Federal
Circuit's patent jurisprudence, and hence the contours of modem
patent law. I will argue in this Article that the particular structure and
needs of the CCPA shaped both its substantive patent law and its
jurisprudential orientation. The question for modem patent law is
whether the stamp of the CCPA's jurisprudence has left us a patent
law that can adequately cope with the demands of patent litigation
today. Part I will sketch the nature and circumstances of the CCPA
and how it viewed its relationship with the Patent Office. Part II
contends that those circumstances uniquely shaped both the
substantive doctrines of patentability the CCPA developed and the
jurisprudential methods the CCPA used to implement them. Part III
shows how the doctrinal heritage of the CCPA continues to shape
Federal Circuit decision making in the critical question of patent
scope. Part IV argues that as a consequence of that heritage, patent
law may have lost the ability to integrate ex ante and ex post
information in the determination of patent scope.
14. Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
15. 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
16. S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
17. The Patent Office was renamed the Patent and Trademark Office in 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-596, § 1, 88 Stat. 1949 (1975), and renamed the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501A-572 (1999). I use "Patent Office" as that
term described the Office for most of the CCPA's existence.
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I. THE CCPA AS AN INSTITUTION
A. Structure: A Nice Little Five-Judge Court
The CCPA was created in 1929, when Congress divested the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia of jurisdiction over
appeals from the Patent Office, and joined that jurisdiction with the
jurisdiction of the Court of Customs Appeals over customs cases to
create the CCPA. The court lasted until 1982, when Congress
created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by combining
the CCPA's jurisdiction with the appellate jurisdiction of the Court
of Claims, and adding to that combination a new and exclusive
jurisdiction over all appeals from the district courts in patent
infringement cases.1 9
The Federal Circuit is often described as a specialized court.20
But this was far truer of the CCPA. Although the CCPA lacked
judges with prior patent expertise during the first half of its
existence,2' the CCPA even then was necessarily more familiar and
more experienced than the modern Federal Circuit when it came to
issues of patentability. Like today's Federal Circuit, the CCPA heard
appeals from the Patent Office where the Office had refused a patent
to an applicant, or from interferences between rival claimants for
priority of invention.22 But the CCPA's docket was far more
18. See Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 488, §§ 1, 2, 45 Stat. 1475, 1475-76. The reason for
transferring jurisdiction was that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was
overburdened with appeals, while the Court of Customs Appeals was underworked. See P.J.
Frederico, Evolution of Patent Office Appeals (Part II), 22 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'Y 920, 946 (1940).
According to Judge Giles Rich, the District of Columbia courts were overburdened with litigation
over Prohibition. See James F. Davis, Interview with Judge Giles S. Rich, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 55, 56
(1999). The Court of Appeals retained appellate jurisdiction over civil actions filed against the
Commissioner. See infra note 22.
19. Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982).
20. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1989).
21. According to Judge Rich, of the CCPA's judges, only himself (1956-82), Arthur M.
Smith (1959-68), Donald E. Lane (1969-79), and Howard M. Markey (1972-82) were patent
lawyers. See Giles S. Rich, Thirty Years of This Judging Business, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 139, 143 n.2
(1986).
22. Since 1927, appeal from an examiner's rejection has first been taken to the Board of
Appeals (now the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences) within the Patent Office. See
Frederico, supra note 18, at 945. Rather than directly appeal the Board's decision, a rejected
applicant or a losing party to an interference may instead commence a civil action-which is
necessary if the appellant wishes to introduce evidence beyond the record generated before the
Patent Office. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 145-146 (2006) (providing for civil action to obtain patent or in
case of interference). Under modem law, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit retains
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specialized than that of the Federal Circuit, with about 80-85 percent
of cases originating from decisions by the Patent Office.23 None of
these cases involved the diverse and difficult issues arising in patent
litigation with which the Federal Circuit must now contend.24 And of
course, the CCPA was not vested with the Federal Circuit's
extensive non-patent jurisdiction, which by number comprises the
majority of its current docket.25
No doubt on account of its restricted jurisdiction, the CCPA was
also a leisurely court that had the time to invest in careful review of
patentability decisions. According to Judge Rich, when he joined the
CCPA in 1956, "[t]he court sat from October to May and
occasionally skipped a month for want of enough to do. . . . I did
have time for deliberation."26 Shortly after he became a judge on the
Federal Circuit, however, Judge Rich noted, "People soon started
asking me how I liked it and I developed a stock answer: 'I am not
delighted, I am diluted. "'27 The Federal Circuit certainly does not
recess for four months of the year, and with its larger and more
complex docket, its judges do not have the same luxury of devoting
the same time and attention to cases as their predecessors enjoyed.
The CCPA may have also been a more collegial and flexible
court. The Federal Circuit is undoubtedly no less collegial and
flexible than other courts of appeals, but the CCPA, by reason of its
structure, was inherently more so. Judge Rich, from his vantage point
as a Federal Circuit judge, almost wistfully described the intimacy of
the CCPA: "The CCPA was a nice little five-judge court pretty much
specializing in patents which in recent years had managed to have
exclusive jurisdiction over an appeal from the district court in such an action, ensuring uniform
appellate review regardless of which avenue is taken. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(C) (2006).
However, prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, appeal in a civil action remained with the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, rather than the CCPA. See Frederico, supra
note 18, at 947.
23. See Rich, supra note 21, at 140-41.
24. Judge Rich describes how the Federal Circuit's new jurisdiction over patent infringement
litigation required its judges to grapple with new substantive and procedural issues which were
completely unfamiliar to them. See id. at 147.
25. See id. at 141-43.
26. Id. at 141.
27. Id. at 146.
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two or three patent lawyers on it at the same time. It always sat in
banc."28
Aside from the purely social aspects of a smaller court, a court
in which all cases are heard en banc may retain more doctrinal
consistency and flexibility than is possible with a court that sits in
panels. The Federal Circuit, like other intermediate courts, follows
the rule of "interpanel accord."29 Under that rule, precedent
established by an earlier panel of the court binds all future panels,
unless the court overrules it en banc." The rule of interpanel accord
exacerbates the path dependency of common law adjudication: legal
doctrine is shaped not only by the nature of disputes that reach the
appellate court (and how those cases are framed by their advocates),
but also by the random composition of the particular panel hearing
the case." Hence, as compared to the CCPA's jurisprudence, the
Federal Circuit's jurisprudence may correspond less closely to the
policy preferences of its judges as a collective group, being in part
the idiosyncratic product of the panel first presented with an issue.
Furthermore, though the CCPA adhered to the general principle
of stare decisis and would not overrule its past precedents absent
strong justification,32 the court's practice of sitting en banc meant
that precedent was relatively free to change should the court so
desire. At the Federal Circuit, in contrast, en banc review is an
extraordinary occurrence. Even doctrine that does not command a
majority of the court may persist for long periods of time given the
hurdles to securing en banc review. Thus, as compared to today's
Federal Circuit, the CCPA may have been more free to evolve legal
doctrines in tentative or experimental steps, and adjust those
doctrines as later experience or conditions showed their faults.
28. Id. at 147. Judge Rich explains that the CCPA used the term "in banc" rather than "en
banc" following the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. at 146-47; FED. R. APP. P. 35(b).
29. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 772 F.2d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir.
1985) ("Counsel is apparently unaware that a panel of this court is bound by prior precedential
decisions unless and until overturned in banc.") (italics in original).
30. Id.
31. Comparing the panel adjudication of the Federal Circuit to the en banc regime of the
CCPA, Judge Rich noted, "I felt much more secure in the sense of less likelihood of a mistake
being made with the CCPA where three had to agree to decide a case. Three-judge panels
sometimes make me very itchy; it take only two judges to decide a case .... The chance factor is
very great." Rich, supra note 21, at 148.
32. See, e.g., In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 868-69 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (Kirkpatrick, J.,
dissenting).
850
THE CONSTITUTION OF PA TENT LAW
B. Context: The Imperative of Control
The CCPA's patent jurisprudence was, except with respect to
interferences," articulated almost exclusively in the context of
reviewing patentability determinations by the Patent Office.34 This
consideration, more than anything else, shaped the CCPA's patent
jurisprudence, and through the adoption of the CCPA's precedent, it
continues to hold sway over modem patent doctrine.
The CCPA's patent jurisprudence was a unique product of its
context in two key respects. First, the CCPA's patentability
jurisprudence was constructed to facilitate control over the Patent
Office. And the CCPA was not shy about exercising that control. At
least during its later years, the CCPA's major goal was to bring the
Patent Office to heel on key points of patentability doctrine such as
nonobviousness, utility, patentable subject matter, and the nature of
35 U.S.C. § 112's disclosure requirement.35 Prior to the late 1950s,
the CCPA and the Patent Office seemed largely in accord on major
issues such as the standards of nonobviousness and utility.36 But from
that point on, the CCPA-primarily under the guidance of Judge
Rich-began to impose on the Patent Office many of the contours of
modem patent law."
The CCPA's method of imposing control over Patent Office
decisions was to articulate a relatively complex and precise body of
legal doctrine on patentability. Appellate courts have long used the
development of legal doctrine to control the behavior of lower
tribunals.3 ' But compared to an ordinary appellate court, the CCPA's
peculiar disposition left a distinct stamp on its patentability
33. Prior to the revision of 35 U.S.C. § 135 in 1984 (and hence during the CCPA's entire
existence), interferences generally resolved only priority issues and could not address
patentability.
34. Under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, 19
U.S.C. § 1337, the CCPA in its last years heard a handful of appeals from decisions of the
International Trade Commission, in which the Commission could bar importation of articles that
would infringe U.S. patents. See Coleco Indus. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247, 1249
(C.C.P.A. 1978) ("This case presents the first appeal under [§ 1337], as amended, in which we
reach the merits.").
35. See infra Part Il.
36. See Edwin L. Reynolds, The Standard of Invention in the Patent Office, in 1 DYNAMICS
OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (William B. Ball ed., 1960).
37. See generally Rich, supra note 21.
38. See infra Part II.A.
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jurisprudence. First, the CCPA's patent jurisprudence was articulated
within the statutory framework of the patent statutes, not within a
common law regime. Second, the law of patentability was developed
in the course of maintaining control over an administrative agency,
not in the course of asserting control over a trial judge or jury. And
third, within its sphere, the CCPA's control (or perhaps its insularity)
was more complete than that of most reviewing courts. Though the
courts of appeals reviewed patentability matters in infringement
cases, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
occasionally reviewed Patent Office decisions, neither the CCPA nor
the Patent Office paid much heed to the decisions of other courts.39
Moreover, the nature of the CCPA's review over Patent Office
decisions did not remotely resemble what is expected from a
reviewing court today. Whatever the nominal standard of review
applied to Patent Office decisions might have been, certainly in its
later days, the CCPA gave little or no deference to Patent Office
determinations.4 0 Judge Rich was remarkably candid in comparing
the CCPA's review to the Federal Circuit's review of district court
fact findings under the "clearly erroneous" standard of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure4 1: "In the CCPA, we were not reviewing
trials, and Rule 52(a) was not applicable. Or if it was, we ignored it.
Reviewing the PTO Boards, our attitude was we reversed them if
they were wrong."4 2 Thus, far from the deferential review we might
expect from a reviewing court today, the CCPA's isolation from the
mainstream of administrative law permitted it to exert exceptional
control over Patent Office practice and individual patentability
decisions.
39. See Third Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, 72 F.R.D. 239, 295 (1976) (comments of Gerald Rose) (noting that the CCPA rarely
cited precedent from courts other than itself); Reynolds, supra note 36, at 10 (noting that three-
fourths of decisions cited by Patent Office Board of Appeals decisions were from the CCPA).
40. See In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1455-56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev'd sub nom.
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (discussing CCPA review of Patent Office decisions).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
42. Rich, supra note 21, at 149. See also In re Zurko, 142 F.3d at 1455 n.5 (suggesting that
Patent Office decisions received less deference from the CCPA beginning in the early 1950s). In
contrast, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed Patent Office decisions even
more deferentially than it reviewed those of other agencies, at least with respect to technical
determinations. See Abbott v. Coe, 109 F.2d 449, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1944). However, the CCPA
exerted far more influence on the Patent Office than the D.C. Circuit did, due to the greater
number of cases reviewed by the CCPA and the greater thoroughness of its opinions. See
Reynolds, supra note 36, at 9-10.
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C. Outlook. The Prospective Perspective
Perhaps the most significant determinant of the CCPA's
patentability jurisprudence was its timing. The CCPA's view of the
patent system was through the lens of the Patent Office and the
patent procurement process. Most appellate court decision making is
at least partially retrospective, in that the real-world consequences of
a legal rule become evident in the dispute between the parties before
the court. However, the effects of the CCPA's decisions were almost
entirely prospective: the court considered only patentability and not
patent enforcement. Because the CCPA lacked jurisdiction over
patent infringement actions, the CCPA's perspective was confined to
the review of Patent Office actions denying patentability, except in
the context of interferences, in which the court reviewed disputes
between rival inventors claiming priority of invention.43
Patent Office decisions were (and still are) prospective in the
sense that the agency has little or no ability to gauge the
consequences of granting a patent of broad or narrow scope to any
particular applicant. The successful applicant takes his patent off into
the world to enforce, and in nearly all cases the Patent Office's role
has ended." Even if the Patent Office was inclined to pursue
particular policies of patent scope, the limitation of the agency's
responsibility to granting or denying patents means that the agency
cannot readily incorporate information about post-grant policy
consequences into its decision-making process.45
Though one step removed from the trenches, the CCPA was also
not inclined to pursue an integrated vision of patent policy. Being
limited to reviewing Patent Office determinations, the court no less
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2006).
44. Issued patents may be reopened before the Patent Office in a re-examination procedure,
and the Patent Office will be notified if that patent is involved in litigation. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 290,
301-318.
45. Historically, the Patent Office appeared little influenced even by the external influences
most directly relevant to its responsibilities. See Reynolds, supra note 36, at 6-9. Though trial
and appellate courts repeatedly held patents invalid for obviousness in patent litigation in the
decades leading up to the 1952 Act, the long lapse of time between the Patent Office's grant of
the patent and its invalidation during litigation, and the lack of any formal mechanism to
recognize and communicate such information to the examining corps, made the Patent Office
unable or unwilling to change its standards of patentability in response. See id. at 9. If the agency
could not even take into account information about outcomes of patent litigation in its decision-
making process, then it was unlikely to have taken into account long-range policy consequences.
See id.
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than the Patent Office was confined to prospective decision making.
It evaluated each case without knowing how any one grant or denial
would affect innovation, competition, or other economic activity.
Even in those rare instances where the importance of a particular
patent grant was evident, the court (at least ostensibly) treated the
consequences of patent scope as a question beyond its concern.
Perhaps the prime example is In re Hogan.46 Hogan dealt with a
claim to a synthetic polymer of 4-methyl-1-pentene; 47 at the time the
appeal was decided, the patent application had been pending for
more than twenty years after the first priority applications were
filed.48 The Patent Office had rejected the applicants' claims for lack
of enablement under § 112.49 The Patent Office's rejection derived,
in part, from a concern that the applicants' general claims to
"polymers" could be construed to cover so-called "amorphous"
forms of the pentene polymer that were not known when the original
application was filed in 1953, and which could not be synthesized by
the applicants' process." In other words, later developments in the
art demonstrated that an unqualified claim to "polymers" might grant
the applicants exclusive rights over later-developed polymers that
were not- enabled by the applicants' disclosure. The CCPA, however,
rejected the argument that such considerations should influence the
question of whether the priority applications enabled the claims in
question." According to Chief Judge Markey,
[t]he PTO position, that claim 13 is of sufficient breadth to
cover the later state of the art (amorphous polymers) shown
in the "references," reflects a concern that allowance of
claim 13 might lead to enforcement efforts against the later
developers. Any such conjecture, if it exists, is both
46. 559 F.2d 595, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
47. The application in Hogan was a divisional of the same application that ultimately
established Phillips Petroleum's priority of invention in the protracted polypropylene litigation,
but the claim in Hogan was directed to a 4-methyl-1-pentene polymer rather than a propylene
polymer.
48. The original priority application was filed in 1953, and Hogan was decided in 1977. See
In re Hogan, 559 F.2d at 595.
49. Id. at 603.
50. Id. at 602.
51. Id. at 607.
854
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irrelevant and unwarranted. The business of the PTO is
patentability, not infringement.52
Judge Markey regarded these concerns as exclusive matters for
the courts in deciding infringement suits, and not for the Patent
Office in deciding patentability." And, according to Judge Markey,
the courts would ensure that no such mischief would ensue in patent
litigation: the judicially created reverse doctrine of equivalents "may
be safely relied upon to preclude improper enforcement against later
developers." 54 However, as most students of patent law know, that
optimistic prediction has not described the later reception of the
reverse doctrine of equivalents at the hands of the Federal Circuit."
Likewise, the CCPA was not inclined to credit arguments that
the grant of particular patents, or even patents in general, might
impede innovation. 6 In a case raising the question of whether novel
chemical compounds were patentable even though the applicant had
not demonstrated any practical utility for the compound, Judge Rich
dismissed the objection that such patents would impede basic
research: "To dispose quickly of a collateral point of law,
experimental use is not infringement."" Despite Judge Rich's
52. Id. at 607.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Arch. Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2002) ("Not once has this court affirmed a decision finding noninfringement based on the reverse
doctrine of equivalents."). Indeed, when defendants who were sued on a patent related to the one
in Hogan tried to raise the reverse doctrine of equivalents as a defense, arguing that their
polypropylene product was so diverged from the principle of the polypropylene disclosed in the
1953 application that they should escape infringement, Markey (now Chief Judge of the Federal
Circuit) neatly neutered the defense by defining the principle of the claimed invention
exceedingly broadly: "[T]he production for the first time of crystalline polypropylene." U.S. Steel
Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1253 (1989) (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1278, 1354 (D. Del. 1987)). Since the defendants also made
crystalline polypropylene, they had made no change in that principle and were liable for
infringement. Id.
56. One might speculate that the CCPA's vantage point inclined it to be more "pro-patent"
than a court that also reviewed litigation might have been. The court was presented only with the
benefits of the patent system: inventions and inventors spurred by the prospect of a patent. It did
not see the costs, such as infringers who were forced to abandon otherwise legitimate and
productive activity.
57. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court
in Brenner v. Manson ruled that an inventor must demonstrate that "specific benefit exists in
currently available form" to comply with the utility requirement of § 101. Brenner v. Manson,
383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1968); see infra text accompanying notes 59-74.
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confidence, experimental use has fared even worse than the reverse
doctrine of equivalents as a post-grant mechanism for limiting the
effects of patent scope.58
In summary, the CCPA's patentability jurisprudence was the
product of a uniquely situated court. First, the court's structure and
vantage point gave rise to a body of law to be wielded by
experienced judges with the time and inclination to delve deeply into
questions of patentability. Those judges would be free to decide
appeals largely according to their own views, unhindered by the
constraint of deference to a lower tribunal. The CCPA's intimacy
meant that positions adopted by the court usually commanded a
majority of the court's judges, while the flexibility provided by
always sitting en banc permitted the court to revise its doctrine and
policy choices relatively freely. Second, the court's patentability
jurisprudence was created to control and direct the Patent Office,
meaning that both its substance and its justification would have to be
tailored to the problem of administrative control. Finally, because
decisions of the Patent Office were nearly always made in the
absence of information about how the patent claim in question would
be enforced, the CCPA's review of such decisions was either
inherently or explicitly anti-consequentialist. Even on those
occasions where the court was informed of the social cost of any one
patent grant, the court was not inclined to consider the repercussions
of patent scope.
II. THE CCPA's BODY OF PATENTABILITY LAW
How did the CCPA's unique setting shape its patentability
jurisprudence? In other words, how was the course of patent law
different than it might have been had patentability been entrusted to
an ordinary court of appeals? We cannot answer that counterfactual
definitively, except where we can compare the CCPA's doctrines
with the contemporary doctrines of other courts." But we can
identify distinct aspects of the CCPA's patentability jurisprudence
that likely derived from the court's peculiar setting, and that
unquestionably laid the foundation for the modem regime of patent
scope.
58. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (describing
experimental use defense as "very narrow and strictly limited").
59. See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of comparative doctrines.
856
THE CONSTITUTION OF PA TENT LAW
The first is methodological. The CCPA employed specific
jurisprudential tools to shape patent law and exert control over the
Patent Office. Those methods left their mark on the substance of
patent law as well, and have been carried forward in the
jurisprudential outlook of the Federal Circuit today. The second is
substantive. Intertwined with the CCPA's jurisprudential
methodology were particular doctrinal choices the court made in its
implementation of the 1952 Patent Act-most notably in the law of
nonobviousness and in the law of disclosure. Because those two
doctrines essentially define the extent of patent scope, the CCPA's
choices defined both the substance and the scope of the doctrine
handed down to the Federal Circuit and the doctrinal tools available
to the court to resolve patent scope issues.
A. The CCPA's Jurisprudential Methodology
In the years following the 1952 Patent Act, the CCPA's
patentability decisions employed two key jurisprudential methods to
articulate the law of patentability and to impose it upon the Patent
Office. The first method I will term "statutory fidelity": a
commitment to grounding the law of patentability firmly in the
specific text of the 1952 Patent Act. The other method I will term
"conceptual differentiation": a commitment to crystallizing separate
and distinct patentability doctrines out of the relatively
undifferentiated body of patent law as it stood midcentury.
The two methods were related, of course: the court justified
most of its newly defined and clarified doctrines by tethering them
closely to particular sections of the 1952 Patent Act. Both
methodologies were also essentially formalist in their commitment to
sharply defined categories and their commitment to a system of
patentability that could be derived from a small set (in this case
statutory) of fundamental principles. Both may also be understood as
responses to the CCPA's needs in its relationship with the Patent
Office: they provided doctrinal levers for the court to control the
Patent Office's decisions, and they provided legitimacy for the
court's exercise of that control.
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1. Statutory Fidelity
The key CCPA decisions following the 1952 Patent Act
emphasized above all else that Patent Office rejections must be
firmly grounded in one (and only one) of the provisions of the 1952
Patent Act.60 Fidelity to the statutory text may well have been a
cherished judicial goal in and of itself. However, at least for some
judges of the CCPA, the court's emphasis on the attachment of
patent law to statutory text provided the means to achieve and
legitimatize the imposition of judicial control over the Patent Office.
Again, Judge Rich's description is revealing. In describing the salient
achievements of the CCPA, he noted:
There were some other law questions which the CCPA
cleared up along the way such as abolishing some favorite
Patent Office grounds of rejection you consequently do not
hear of any more, including "aggregation," "undue breadth"
of claims, and "mere function of apparatus." In general, the
grounds were that there was no basis for them in the 1952
statute (or its predecessors) and that it was necessary that
there be such a basis. The one exception to this, as matters
evolved, was "obviousness-type double patenting," which is
pure case law."
Judge Rich no doubt valued the principle of adherence to
statutory text for its own sake.62 Yet the CCPA judges could readily
have used the principle of textual fidelity as a means to pursue other
goals as well. As Judge Rich's comment on "obviousness-type"
double patenting shows, he was enough of a pragmatist to rely on
common law development when he sought to implement a particular
policy, notwithstanding the lack of a foundation in the statutory
text.63 But to the extent the court was concerned about the scope of
the CCPA's authority to control Patent Office policy, justifying
decisions by the principle of statutory fidelity provided incontestable
60. See, e.g., In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
61. Rich, supra note 21, at 144.
62. Of course, Judge Rich, as one of the architects of the 1952 Patent Act, would naturally
be conunitted to fostering adherence to the statute.
63. Rich, supra note 21, at 144.
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legitimacy to the court's efforts to impose its views on the Patent
Office.'
2. Conceptual Differentiation
Adherence to statutory text provided legitimacy to the CCPA's
control over the Patent Office, but it was not the only (or even the
primary) vehicle for the CCPA's program. The court's most effective
means of control was to replace the existing body of relatively vague
patentability laws with a more complex and detailed patentability
jurisprudence. To do so may have provided a more intellectually
rigorous and satisfying body of patent laws; however, it also
provided the doctrinal framework permitting the court to cabin the
Patent Office's discretion and implement its own patentability
policies.
Appellate courts have a long tradition of articulating complex
doctrinal frameworks that, consciously or unconsciously, serve to
control the judgments of lower tribunals." Leon Green described the
process as follows:
If [appellate courts] are to review each step of a case with
intelligent appreciation, then they must have devices which
lay open those steps and make it possible to give effect to
their own judgments. And a more plentiful supply of
intellectual machinery has probably never been mobilized
in any other field or any other science. . . . This machinery
is made up of a network of theories, doctrines, formulas and
rules of the utmost flexibility in the hands of judges who
understand their uses.
64. The statutes providing for CCPA review of Patent Office decisions, like the current
statutes providing for appeal to the Federal Circuit, did not specify any standard of review or
particular grounds for reversal. The 1952 Act simply provided that the court "shall hear and
determine such appeal on the evidence produced before the Patent Office, and the decision shall
be confined to the points set forth in the reasons of appeal." 35 U.S.C. § 144 (1952). The
predecessor statute was similar: the court "shall hear and determine such appeal, and revise the
decision appealed from in a summary way, on the evidence produced before the commissioner, at
such early and convenient time as the court may appoint; and the revision shall be confined to the
points set forth in the reasons of appeal." 35 U.S.C. § 62 (1934).
65. See LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 383-85 (1930). Green was describing the
development of tort law.
66. Id. at 381-82. Green noted the array of procedural devices created to control the trial
process, but maintained that procedural rules such as jurisdiction, evidence, and jury instruction
were secondary means of control. Id. at 383-84. Rather, appellate courts exercised power
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Though the CCPA sought to control an agency rather than a trial
court, the mechanisms were the same. The CCPA's program to
banish Patent Office reliance on vague concepts like "undue breadth"
or "aggregation" necessarily limited the discretion of the Patent
Office to reject patent applications. Judge Baldwin noted this when
the court articulated inadequate disclosure and claim indefiniteness
as two distinct grounds of rejection rooted in separate paragraphs of
35 U.S.C. § 112:
Beginning in 1970, we departed from a vast line of
authority which permitted the PTO to reject claims under
the second paragraph of [section] 112 for "undue breadth."
Up to that time, examiners quite frequently determined
what they felt the invention was and rejected all claims
which were broader than their conception of the invention,
using the second paragraph of [section] 112 as the statutory
basis. 7
We may term this doctrinal approach "conceptual
differentiation." Patentability doctrines were divided into distinct
categories, and legal argument or inquiry usually had to be classified
into one category to the exclusion of any others. As a corollary, once
particular facts-for example, the differences between the prior art
and the claimed invention-were assigned to one inquiry or another,
those facts tended to be confined to that inquiry and excluded from
the others. Wherever possible, these inquiries took the form of binary
decisions, and again the information relevant to one inquiry was
frequently discarded once the question had been answered yes or no.
An example will illustrate these methodologies. Consider Judge
Rich's opinion in In re Nelson.6" The facts in Nelson were nearly the
same as those arising later in Brenner v. Manson." As in Brenner,
primarily "through far more subtle theories and formulas"-the legal doctrines particular to each
field of law. Id. at 384. "It is these which for lack of a better name we look upon as substantive
law, and through which appellate judges control the judgments below, whether of trial judges or
juries." Id. at 385.
67. In re Mayhew, 527 F.2d 1229, 1235 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
68. 280 F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
69. 383 U.S. 519 (1966). In Brenner, the Supreme Court held that applicants claiming a
process of synthesizing chemical compounds needed to show more than that the process worked
and that the resulting compounds were of interest in scientific research; they needed to
demonstrate that the compounds yielded "specific benefit exist[ing] in currently available form"
to satisfy the utility requirement of § 101. Id. at 534-35.
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the applicants in Nelson had discovered how to synthesize novel
steroid molecules, but did not identify any use for the new
compounds." Their disclosure asserted that the claimed steroids were
"valuable intermediates" in the synthesis of another class of steroid
molecules assumed to have physiological activity."
The Patent Office rejected Nelson's claims for lack of utility.7 2
The rejection was based not on the requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101
that the invention be "useful," but rather on 35 U.S.C. § 112's
requirement that a patent's specification disclose "the manner and
process of making and using"3 the invention.74 Because the
applicants had "not shown how their intermediate may be used to
prepare a single useful steroid,"" their specification did not satisfy
the disclosure requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112."
Judge Rich strongly believed that any novel and nonobvious
chemical compound should per se be regarded as useful and
therefore patentable, regardless of whether any use for the molecule
was then known." But he spoke of policy only after the battle was
lost. In his dissent in In re Kirk (subsequent to Brenner v. Manson),
he eloquently and powerfully set forth policy rationales for a rule of
per se utility." However, such discussion is nearly absent from his
opinion in Nelson. In Nelson, Judge Rich justified reversal not on
account of the Patent Office's poor policy choice, but on account of
the Patent Office's "scrambling of the separate statutory
requirements"" that an invention must be useful, and the requirement
that the application must adequately teach one of skill in the art how
70. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d at 176.
71. Id. at 175-76. The application claimed 14-hydroxy androstenes, which could be
hydrogenated to yield 14-hydroxy steroids. Id. The disclosure stated generally that "[i]mportant
physiological properties are attributed" to 14-hydroxy steroids. Id. at 175.
72. Id. at 176.
73. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (emphasis added).
74. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d at 176.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
patent statute should be amended to provide per se patentability for new and nonobvious chemical
compounds if Kirk were not overruled).
78. See id. at 957-63 (arguing on multiple administrative and policy grounds that novel and
nonobvious compounds should be patentable without demonstration of practical utility).
79. In re Nelson, 280 F.2d at 177.
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to use the invention.8 ' For Judge Rich, the long-standing requirement
in patent law that an invention possess utility was a question of
compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 101 alone.8 ' And under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, it was sufficient that the claimed intermediates could be useful
to chemists doing research on steroids.8 2
Judge Rich's strategy to eliminate any requirement for practical
utility was to divide and conquer. The argument against patentability
in Nelson depended on the "how to use" language of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112. Even if we were to concede that "useful" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 demands no more than that the claimed invention works, we
might plausibly still demand that the inventor disclose a practical use
for the invention to comply with the separate "how to use" language
of 35 U.S.C. § 112. This was the position of the Patent Office and of
Judge Kirkpatrick's dissent in In re Nelson:
The requirements of Section 112 as to showing manner of
using are inseparable from those of Section 101 as to
usefulness. The provision of Section 112 that the
specification shall describe the manner of using a process or
composition of matter (unless it is obvious) certainly
means, in view of Section 101, that the applicant must show
how his invention can be employed usefully."
But in Judge Rich's view, such reasoning merely confused the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112. Having set the bar of the
35 U.S.C. § 101 requirement exceedingly low, Judge Rich exploited
the division between the statutes to nearly eliminate the requirement
in practice:
If we assume . . . that all chemical compounds are
inherently useful and so have the "utility" required by
section 101, we are still left with the problem of compliance
with section 112, which is not directed to the existence of
80. Id.
81. See id. at 181.
82. See id. at 180-81.
83. Id. at 191 (Kirkpatrick, J., dissenting); see also id. at 190 (arguing that Congress added
§ 112 to supplement the requirement of § 101). Chief Judge Worley dissented on policy grounds,
advancing essentially the same arguments the Supreme Court was later to endorse in Brenner. See
id. at 190 (Worley, C.J., dissenting).
Spring 2010] THE CONSTITUTION OF PATENT LAW 863
usefulness but to what an inventor must disclose as the quid
pro quo for patent protection.'
Note that in Rich's formulation, the existence of utility is divorced
from the question of whether the inventor has disclosed a utility for
the invention. If the legal question is whether utility exists or not,
then presumably any method of demonstrating utility-such as
knowledge of those skilled in the art, expert testimony, or judicial
notice-would suffice to establish patentability. No specific
disclosure and, by implication, no knowledge on the part of the
applicant, was necessary to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112." Given
that the applicants in Nelson explicitly stated that their compounds
were useful as intermediates and enabled one skilled in the art to use
them as intermediates, Judge Rich held that the applicants had
satisfied the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112."
Judge Rich lost the battle, but he largely won the war. The
Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson held that an inventor must
demonstrate practical utility for an invention to be patentable."
However, despite contemporary criticism of Nelson's rigid
separation between 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 112," the Supreme Court
characterized the issue in Brenner v. Manson solely as a question of
84. Id. at 184.
85. See id. at 184-85 (stating that specific recitations of use were not required where use was
inherent in description, where disclosure of a sufficient number of properties would make use
obvious, or where use would be apparent to those with ordinary skill in the art). Nelson was
decided against the backdrop of the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Petrocarbon Ltd. v. Watson,
247 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In Petrocarbon, the application had merely disclosed that the
claimed process yielded a polymer film resistant to various solvents. See id. at 801. Bringing suit
against the Commissioner in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the applicant had
sought to introduce expert testimony showing that the film yielded by the process had utility as a
protective coating. See id. Over a dissent by then-Judge Burger, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
district court's exclusion of the evidence, holding that § 112 required the applicant to disclose the
utility of the claimed process in his specification. See id. at 801-02. Judge Rich rejected the
reasoning of Petrocarbon in Nelson. See In re Nelson, 280 F.2d at 186.
86. See In re Nelson, 280 F.2d at 186.
87. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
88. See Note, The Utility Requirement in Patent Law, 53 GEO. L.J. 154, 189 (1964)
(criticizing the CCPA's "rigid adherence to the proposition that sections 101 and 112 are
completely distinct."). Judge Rich's reasoning that the "useful" language of § 101 preempts
considerations of utility in other sections of the Patent Act is intellectually appealing but difficult
to sustain. Section 101 also demands that the invention be "new," but no one would suggest this
preempts consideration of novelty in § 102. See P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent
Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 161, 178 (1993) (noting committee report stating that
§ 102 amplifies and defines the meaning of "new" in § 101).
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compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 101 without reference to 35 U.S.C.
§ 112." Judge Rich was left free to erode the standard of practical
utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in subsequent cases." But those
developments are beside the point of the present discussion. Nelson
illustrates perfectly how the CCPA-and Judge Rich in particular-
employed the tools of statutory fidelity and conceptual differentiation
to impose policy upon the Patent Office. In Nelson, the CCPA's
action was provoked, according to Judge Rich, because the Patent
Office was "developing its own brand new theories and philosophy
about what the statute means by 'useful."' 9 1 Insistence that the notion
of utility was a single concept confined to 35 U.S.C. § 101 permitted
the CCPA to impose its own policy on the law of chemical
patentability while ostensibly insisting on no more than a logical
interpretation of the patent statutes.
B. Substantive Doctrines ofPatent Scope:
35 U.S.C. §§ 103 and 112
The CCPA's methodological legacy thus was a commitment to
relatively formalist principles of statutory fidelity and conceptual
differentiation. But what was the court's legacy for the substantive
law of patentability? Of course, thirty years of decisions following
the 1952 Patent Act shaped nearly every aspect of patentability law.
However, the CCPA truly fashioned the heart of modem patent law
through its decisions regarding two key aspects of patentability: the
law of nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 and the law of
disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Why are these two aspects of patent law so fundamental?
Perhaps the most basic question in any patent system is this: given
that an inventor has created a particular invention at a particular
point in time, how broad are the patent rights to which the inventor is
entitled? The limits on a patentee's entitlement are defined largely by
89. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 528-36.
90. See, e.g., Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (holding that "adequate
proof of any [pharmacological] activity" suffices to establish practical utility).
91. In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 952 (1967) (Rich, J., dissenting). According to the Supreme
Court, the conflict between the Patent Office and the CCPA over chemical utility originated when
the CCPA broke from past precedent in Nelson. See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 530. In contrast, Judge
Rich maintained that around 1950, the Patent Office began to deviate from long-established
principles by demanding a disclosure of practical utility, and that Nelson sought only to stop this
excursion. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d at 950-51.
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two constraints: the state of the art at the time of the invention and
the extent of the patentee's disclosure.92 Every student of modern
patent law knows those limits as the "nonobviousness" requirement
of 35 U.S.C. § 103 and the "enablement" and "written description"
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112. But that understanding of the
problem is very much the legacy of the CCPA. Doctrinally, the
CCPA's most significant accomplishments in the decades following
the 1952 Patent Act were the implementation of the doctrine of
nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, and the differentiation of the
various requirements for disclosure and claims in 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The story of the CCPA's efforts to implement the 1952 Patent
Act's requirement of nonobviousness is fairly well known thanks to
its ultimate evolution into the Federal Circuit's "teaching,
suggestion, or motivation" test.9 3 In Graham v. John Deere,94 the
Supreme Court outlined the factual predicates of the new
nonobviousness inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 103, but it did not specify
how the inquiry itself was to proceed. It was left to the CCPA to
establish that a showing of obviousness required the Patent Office to
demonstrate a reason why one of ordinary skill in the art would
combine or modify the prior art to arrive at the claimed invention."
The CCPA's advances in the law of 35 U.S.C. § 112 are perhaps
less well known. Section 112 sets forth the statutory requirements
that an inventor disclose and claim his invention in his patent
application." The 1952 Patent Act did not change these requirements
significantly. Except for the express authorization of functional
claiming, the text of 35 U.S.C. § 112 differs little from its
92. See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1182-89 (2008) (discussing the relationship
between disclosure requirements and the nonobviousness requirement).
93. See KSR Intern. Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 399 (2007).
94. 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
95. See S. Jay Plager & Lynne E. Pettigrew, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle:
A Response to Nard and Duffy, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1735 (2007) (describing the CCPA's
development of the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" test); see also In re Bergel, 292 F.2d
955, 956-57 (C.C.P.A. 1961) ("The mere fact that it is possible to find two isolated disclosures
which might be combined in such a way to produce a new compound does not necessarily render
such production obvious unless the art also contains something to suggest the desirability of the
proposed combination."). This test, as developed by the Federal Circuit and expanded (but not
rejected) by the Supreme Court in KSR, remains the framework of the § 103 inquiry today. See
generally KSR, 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
96. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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predecessor. However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the CCPA
reshaped the intellectual architecture of patent disclosure and,
consequently, the intellectual architecture of patent scope as well.
In the decades prior to and immediately following the 1952
Patent Act, the Patent Office and the courts frequently cited "undue
breadth" to reject or invalidate claims for a wide variety of faults.97
Subsumed under the category of "undue breadth" were rejections
based on all of the following: inclusion of nonstatutory subject
matter (such as mental steps); lack of utility; divergence between the
applicant's subjective view of the invention and the subject matter
encompassed by the claim; failure of the claim to precisely delineate
the subject matter of the patent; presence of inoperable species
within the ranges defined by the claim; insufficient working
examples or other guidance compared to the scope of the claim;" and
even what we would today categorize as obviousness.99
Starting in the 1960s, the CCPA began to impose the order we
recognize today upon this heterogeneous collection of "undue
breadth" doctrines. The techniques it used were again statutory
fidelity and conceptual differentiation. The court first distinguished
between the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1 (relating
to disclosure) and the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2
(relating to claims).' By the mid-1970s, the court had crystallized
three distinct doctrines of disclosure from the first paragraph of 35
U.S.C. § 112: the modem doctrines of written description,
enablement, and best mode."' Rejections under the second paragraph
of 35 U.S.C. § 112, which requires the applicant to provide "one or
more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
97. See Paul M. Janicke, Patent Disclosure-Some Problems and Current Developments (pt.
2), 52 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 757 (1970).
98. See id. (discussing confusion in Patent Office's "undue breadth" rejections).
99. Under the doctrine of "criticality," a claim reciting a range limitation on a prior art
process would lack "invention" unless that numerical limitation corresponded to a transition at
which the prior art process unexpectedly changed its behavior. Failure to identify the criticality of
the recited transition could render the claim unpatentable under § 112. See, e.g., Helene Curtis
Indus. v. Sales Affiliates, 233 F.2d 148, 153 (2nd Cir. 1956). In modem law, the question would
be treated as whether a sub-genus (the process performed under limited conditions) is nonobvious
over the prior art's disclosure of a broader genus (the process performed under broader
conditions). See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2144.08 (8th ed., rev. July 2008).
100. In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1234 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
101. See, e.g., id. at 1235-36.
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subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention," were
restricted to two grounds.'O2 The first was that the claim language did
not adequately delineate the boundaries of the claim; this is the
modem requirement for definite claims. The second ground for
rejection was that the subject matter delineated by the claims did not
correspond to the subject matter which the applicant (subjectively)
regards as his invention."' Subsequently, the notion that the claims
must correspond to what the applicant subjectively regards as his
invention was more or less abandoned by the CCPA, leaving
indefiniteness-lack of linguistic clarity in claim language-as the
only grounds for rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2. "
Ostensibly, the CCPA's innovations in the interpretation of
§ 103 and § 112 did not change substantive standards of
patentability. Requiring the Patent Office to be more precise in
explaining the grounds of its rejections did not necessarily increase
or decrease the scope of claims granted to applicants.' But
articulating more detailed frameworks for 35 U.S.C. §§ 103 and 112
unquestionably gave the CCPA more control over Patent Office
decisions. Whether or not the court chose to exercise its control,
recasting vague doctrines like "invention" and "undue breadth" into
specific factual and legal inquiries also transformed these doctrines
from opportunities for Patent Office discretion into opportunities for
judicial control. In both instances, the ostensible rationale for
imposing more detailed doctrinal frameworks was to permit
meaningful appellate review. According to the CCPA, the statutory
grounds for rejection "must be identified and framed with sufficient
clarity in the Patent Office so that we can determine with certainty
the areas of our authority under 35 U.S.C. § 144 [the statute
empowering the CCPA to review Patent Office decisions]."' 0 6
Likewise, in the Federal Circuit's view, the demand under 35 U.S.C.
102. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
103. See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
104. See In re Ehrreich, 590 F.2d 902, 905-07 (C.C.P.A. 1979). Judge Baldwin objected to
discarding this concept, see id. at 910 (Baldwin, J., concurring) ("I must strongly disagree with
the suggestion that rejections under the second paragraph of [section] 112 are somehow limited
only to a consideration of whether or not the claims are vague.").
105. See Janicke, supra note 97, at 757 (suggesting that articulation of separate requirements
under § 112 did not expand or contract traditional grounds of rejection).
106. In re Wheeling, 413 F.2d 1187, 1195 (C.C.P.A. 1969); see 35 U.S.C. § 144 (2006).
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§ 103 that the Patent Office articulate a teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine prior art references-rather than relying on
"common sense" or "common knowledge"-was necessary for the
court to review Patent Office actions under the standards of the
Administrative Procedure Act."'
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S INHERITANCE
A. The Regional Circuits: The Dustbin ofHistory
As we have just seen, by 1982 the CCPA had evolved a body of
patentability jurisprudence that was devoted to the themes of
statutory fidelity and conceptual separation. This body of doctrine
was designed to be wielded by a court of specialized judges over an
administrative agency with little concern for the niceties of appellate
review. It was a body of law developed to answer the questions of
patentability in a specific context-namely, Patent Office rejection
of patent applications.
At the time the Federal Circuit was created, there was another
body of patent jurisprudence beside the CCPA's: the caselaw
developed by the district courts and the courts of appeals through the
administration of the patent litigation system. However, when the
Federal Circuit decided, in its very first case, to adopt the law of its
predecessor courts, it thereby rejected, without consideration, every
aspect of the circuit courts' patent jurisprudence insofar as it might
conflict with the CCPA's jurisprudence.
Of course, the Federal Circuit was created in large part because
patent law (or at least the outcomes of patent actions) varied widely
between the courts of appeals, leading to uncertainty and forum-
shopping in patent litigation. But it does not follow from the
argument for uniformity that the jurisprudence of the CCPA ought to
have automatically displaced the jurisprudence of the courts of
appeal. Just as the CCPA's law of patentability was shaped by the
particular demands and perspective of reviewing Patent Office
107. See In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2000); In re Zurko, 258 F.3d
1447, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("With respect to core factual findings in a determination of
patentability, however, the Board cannot simply reach conclusions based on its own
understanding or experience-or on its assessment of what would be basic knowledge or
common sense. Rather, the Board must point to some concrete evidence in the record in support
of these findings. To hold otherwise would render the process of appellate review for substantial
evidence on the record a meaningless exercise.") (footnote omitted).
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determinations, the patent jurisprudence of the courts of appeals must
have been shaped by the particular demands and perspective of
patent litigation. Those who urged the creation of the Federal Circuit
to promote uniformity probably would not have argued that in every
case where the law of litigation and the law of patentability
conflicted, the law of litigation must yield. Yet that is exactly what
happened in the Federal Circuit's first decision, South Corp. v.
United States.'" To the extent that any of the precedents evolved by
the circuit courts conflicted with those of the CCPA, the former was
discarded without ceremony or consideration.109
For example, 35 U.S.C. § 282 provides that "[a] patent shall be
presumed valid." Several of the courts of appeals interpreting § 282
had either set a relatively low standard for a challenger to overcome
this presumption, or had held that the presumption was weakened or
destroyed when the challenger introduced prior art that had not been
before the examiner when the patent was granted."o Early in its
history, the Federal Circuit held that the presumption of validity must
be overcome by clear and convincing evidence,"' and is not affected
by the introduction of prior art not before the examiner. 112 Both
principles are commonly criticized today; what is all but forgotten is
that they too are an inheritance from the CCPA."3
108. 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
109. The Federal Circuit in South Corp. adopted the precedent of both of its predecessor
courts. The court therefore also adopted the patent jurisprudence of the Appellate Division of the
Court of Claims, which occasionally decided appeals from patent infringement actions brought
against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. See generally James F. Davis & Frederick S.
Frei, The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Its Patent Law Legacy from the Court of
Claims, 10 APLA Q. J. 243 (1982). Those patent decisions were too few to have much influence
on the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence. See Douglas A. Strawbridge, Daniel W. McDonald & R.
Carl Moy, Patent Law Developments in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit During 1986, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 861, 879 n.150 (1987) (noting paucity of Court of
Claims patent cases). A notable exception is Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl.
1976), whose narrow view of the common law experimental use exception was adopted by the
Federal Circuit. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(following Pitcairn).
110. See Gerald Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary
Look at Its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 1087, 1092-93 (1988)
(surveying pre-Federal Circuit jurisprudence).
I11. See D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
112. See SSIH Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 375 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
113. The CCPA held in Stevenson v. International Trade Commission, 612 F.2d 546, 551
(C.C.P.A. 1979), that the presumption of validity conferred by 35 U.S.C. § 282 must be overcome
by clear and convincing evidence. The Federal Circuit adopted this precedent in a footnote in
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Judge Nichols, who came to the Federal Circuit from the Court
of Claims rather than from the CCPA, wondered if the court was too
hastily discarding the experience of other courts:
I further think that our exclusive jurisdiction, over certain
areas of law, is not to be construed as a legislative direction
to ignore the efforts of other courts to deal with the same
problems, efforts exerted when over many years they
shared the responsibility that is now ours. Not only are such
efforts not to be ignored, but sporadic notice of them, when
it occurs, is not to take the form of selecting decisions that
happen to agree with our thinking, without regard to their
place in the development of the case law in that
jurisdiction."4
But Judge Nichols's disquiet was not shared by the other judges of
the new court. The abandonment of the circuit courts' patentability
law set the pattern for the Federal Circuit's treatment of circuit court
jurisprudence; even where the Federal Circuit was not bound by
CCPA precedent, the new court paid relatively little heed to the law
of infringement that had been developed by the regional courts of
appeal when it held a contrary view."'
In South Corp., Chief Judge Markey justified wholesale
adoption on the grounds that it would allow for reasoned deliberation
of patent issues rather than mire the court immediately in the
question of how to resolve conflicting bodies of precedent."'
Resolving the conflicts then inherent in the law of patent litigation
would, in Markey's words, require a "careful, considered, cautious,
D.L. Auld. See D.L. Auld, 714 F.2d at 1147 n.2 (citing Astra-Sjuco, A.B. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
629 F.2d 682 688 (C.C.P.A. 1980), in turn citing Stevenson, 612 F.2d at 550). The CCPA held in
Solder Removal Co. v. International Trade Commission, 582 F.2d 628, 632-33 (C.C.P.A. 1978),
that the presumption remains regardless of whether the pertinent prior art was considered by the
examiner. Solder Removal was adopted by the Federal Circuit in SSIH Equipment, 718 F.2d at
375. Both Stevenson and Solder Removal were among the handful of infringement cases decided
by the CCPA under § 337 of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1337. In fact, precedent from the Court
of Claims had held that pertinent prior art not before the examiner "seriously weakens" the
presumption of validity. Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 745, 761 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
Despite adopting the Court of Claims' precedent in South Corp., the Federal Circuit ignored
without mention General Electric, in favor of the CCPA's precedent.
114. Weinar v. Rollform Inc., 744 F.2d 797, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Nichols, J., concurring).
115. For example, in Weinar, Judge Markey dismissed suggestions from prior Circuit Court
cases that special interrogatories were especially attractive in patent cases. See id. at 809.
116. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
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and contemplative approach."'17 Yet the court made one of its most
significant decisions in modem patent law in its very first opinion,
and not even a patent case at that. Decades' worth of circuit court
jurisprudence was discarded without any contemplation at all.
Whether Judge Markey was conscious of this choice or not, his
jurisprudential outlook, like that of his fellow CCPA judges, would
have been shaped by his experience on the CCPA. The CCPA
provided a setting in which the court's precedent could evolve
relatively freely, unconstrained by the rule of interpanel accord and
not particularly confined by standards of appellate review. If the
CCPA's patentability rules needed revision to meet the demands of
patent litigation, then perhaps those rules could be changed in a
future case. But jurisprudential evolution is more difficult at the
Federal Circuit because it is a larger court than the CCPA and
adheres to the rule of interpanel accord. Of course, the Federal
Circuit can and does sit en banc to resolve panel conflicts and
overhaul precedents that no longer appear viable."' But as in any
legal regime, once the fundamental contours and methodologies of
the law have been established, changing them is even more difficult
than changing individual rules. The CCPA's jurisprudential heritage
is in many respects the constitution of our patent law. The Federal
Circuit has been constrained to operate within the CCPA's doctrinal
framework, and its doctrinal methods continue to shape modem
patent law today. The question we must answer is how well those
methods are serving the demands of the patent system today.
B. The Challenge for the Federal Circuit
The intellectual descent of modem patent law from the CCPA
may explain why today's Federal Circuit cannot, or does not; play a
more active policy role in questions of patent scope. This thesis
seems paradoxical at first. The CCPA's jurisprudence was articulated
to control the Patent Office's use of discretion on key points of
patentability law. If the CCPA's jurisprudence was designed to exert
control over the Patent Office, then presumably that jurisprudence
should also provide the Federal Circuit with ample means to control
117. Id. at 1371.
118. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(overruling Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
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patent policy. But a system designed to provide control in one
context does not necessarily facilitate control in another.
Specifically, adaptation of the CCPA regime to the constraints of
patent litigation may not have yielded a system amenable to coherent
policy direction.
Consider how the newly created Federal Circuit was situated
compared to its predecessor. Aside from the challenges of deciding
new aspects of law, the Federal Circuit's new role in reviewing
patent litigation at the appellate level radically diverged from the
experience of its predecessor in two salient ways. First, the volume
of cases increased significantly."' As glimpsed in Judge Rich's
laments, the combination of new substantive fields of law and the
increased number of appeals left the judges with less time to consider
the merits of individual cases, despite the increase in the number of
judges from five to twelve.'20 Second, the court's decisional freedom
became much more constrained by adherence to standards of review.
As Judge Rich's comments reveal, the court was no longer free to
impose its own views without regard for the factual findings of the
lower tribunal:
One of the things that changed in the transition from CCPA
to CAFC is much greater emphasis in the new court on
standard of review. . . . Today there is less likelihood of the
court upsetting trial courts' fact finding than there used to
be, and I am sorry to say that this is true even where a lazy
trial judge, who may even have been inattentive during the
trial or clearly incompetent to deal with the technology in a
complex case, has made all of his fact findings by adopting
proposed findings of the winning party. The attitude tends
to be: "Well he adopted them; they are his findings."l2 '
Thus, in any individual case, outcomes at the Federal Circuit depend
more on the idiosyncrasies of the proceeding at the lower tribunal
and less on policy directions that the appellate judges might prefer.
More generally, how might the court's new authority over patent
litigation have shaped the Federal Circuit's patent jurisprudence? To
understand how patent law at the appellate level may have changed
119. See Rich, supra note 21, at 146-47 (describing increased caseload resulting from the
Federal Circuit's expanded jurisdiction).
120. See id. at 140-41, 143, 147.
121. Id. at 148-49.
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in response to the new demands of patent litigation, it is useful to
draw a historical comparison with the common law of contracts.
Clinton Francis describes how the English common law courts
responded to the explosion of contracts litigation in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. 12 2 The volume of litigation necessitated the
bifurcation of law and fact, the former being resolved by the judges
at Westminster and the latter by the jury. 123 But in a system with
judicial power centralized in the hands of a small number of judges,
the common law courts faced a dilemma: how could they maintain
judicial control over the litigation process with limited judicial
resources? The courts responded by adopting what Francis calls a
"controlled delegation" strategy.124 Rather than structure the litigation
process themselves, the courts would rely on the litigants (through
pleadings) to narrow and define the factual questions to be put to the
jury. 125
Moreover, for complex legal questions, the courts streamlined
the litigation process by relying more heavily on formalistic
doctrines. For example, the common law courts confronted the
question of when a plaintiffs non-performance would excuse the
defendant's breach.126 Rather than adopt an interpretative approach
such as the modem doctrine of material breach-which would
require close judicial scrutiny of the facts of each case-the courts
developed the law of conditions. Under the law of conditions, the
issue of a plaintiffs breach was one "that the litigants could answer
during pleading by mechanically interpreting the language of the
contract in accordance with the law of conditions."l 27 Such
developments tended to reduce judges to a relatively passive role,
and reduced the law of contracts to a rigid and formal system in
which errors of form could divest litigants of their rights
notwithstanding the merits of their claims.128
122. See Clinton W. Francis, The Structure of Judicial Administration and the Development
of Contract Law in Seventeenth-Century England, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 35 (1983).
123. Id. at 39-41.
124. Id. at 41.
125. See id. at 41-51.
126. See id. at 54-55.
127. Id. at 58.
128. See id. at 95-96.
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C. Separation and Formalism: The Atomization ofPatent Law
The same responses that Francis noted in common law contract
litigation are evident in the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence. Several
commentators have noted the court's tendency to rely on formal
doctrines in many aspects of patent law.129 This tendency may derive
directly from the legacy of the CCPA's jurisprudence. The
techniques of statutory fidelity and conceptual separation were
essentially formalist, and this orientation may have been carried
forward into the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence. But as was the case
for English common law judges, the trend towards formalism may be
a mechanism for coping with the increased volume of litigation the
Federal Circuit faces. The evolution of the Federal Circuit's
jurisprudence may therefore represent the superimposition of a
"controlled delegation" framework onto the basic structure of patent
law established by the CCPA. The question is whether that basic
structure, designed for leisurely and flexible application by an
'activist' court, is still suitable for the exercise of policy control
given the Federal Circuit's far different circumstances.
There is reason to doubt that it is still suitable, particularly with
respect to the court's jurisprudence of patent scope. Though it
articulated a detailed doctrinal framework to replace the doctrine of
"undue breadth," the CCPA did not lose sight of the basic policy
questions at stake. For example, in Hogan, while Chief Judge
Markey dismissed concerns about broad enforcement as beyond the
scope of the Patent Office's business, he still thought of the
enablement problem in terms of the underlying policy concerns:
"Rejections under § 112, first paragraph, on the ground that the
scope of enablement is not commensurate with the scope of the
claims, orbit about the more fundamental question: To what scope of
protection is this applicant's particular contribution to the art
entitled?"o
It is more difficult to imagine the Federal Circuit making a
similar statement today. As an example, consider the Federal
Circuit's first opinion in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
129. See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court's Complicity in Federal Circuit
Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2003); John R. Thomas,
Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 771 (2003).
130. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 605-06 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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Inc.,' a significant biotechnology case decided in 2003. Amgen-
like the Selden litigation-was a classic case in which the patentee,
having obtained claims based on an earlier invention, sought to assert
them against a rather different technology developed later. In the
early 1980s, Amgen had cloned the gene for a natural product,
human erythropoietin (EPO).'3 2 Amgen introduced that DNA into the
then-standard gene expression systems to yield, for the first time,
quantities of EPO that were practical for use in treating anemia.133
Amgen obtained patents directed to the cloned EPO gene and its
use.134 But more than a decade after the applications were first filed,
Amgen also secured broader claims. These new patents still claimed
priority from the original invention, but also included claims that
were not limited to any particular technique or expression system,
nor to the use of the cloned EPO gene.' 5 Essentially, these patents
claimed all synthetic EPO compositions that had the biological
function of natural EPO and all cells that were engineered to produce
functional EPO.' 6 Amgen asserted these claims against
Transkaryotic Therapies, whose method of producing EPO used
neither the EPO DNA that Amgen had cloned nor the expression
system that Amgen had developed."
The case thus presented a significant biotechnology policy
question for the Federal Circuit: would the disclosure of one method
of synthesizing a natural product permit the patentee to claim
essentially all synthetic versions of the product?l38 But the Federal
Circuit's majority opinion explicitly disavowed any role in
addressing that policy question. Though acknowledging that a broad
entitlement question was at issue in the case, it considered the
appellate role to be largely limited to determining whether the district
131. 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
132. See id. at 1321.
133. See id. at 1352.
134. See id. at 1321-22.
135. See id. at 1322-23.
136. The patents in suit claimed a "non-naturally occurring" EPO molecule having the same
biological activity as human EPO, see id. at 1322, and "vertebrate cells" engineered to produce
synthetic EPO, see id. at 1323.
137. See id. at 1325-26.
138. See id. at 1359 (Clevenger, J., dissenting).
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court's factual findings were clearly erroneous or not.' The majority
saw little reason to consider "broader arguments seemingly based
upon policy considerations."l 40 Nor was it particularly concerned
with Federal Circuit precedent that was neither raised by the
defendant nor discussed by the district court.141 Such an attitude-in
its limited view of the appellate role and the delegation of legal
inquiry to the efforts of the litigants-seems very much akin to that
adopted by the English common law courts.
The Amgen opinion is also a good example of how the heritage
of conceptual separation and statutory fidelity may impede policy
analysis, even assuming the court was inclined to undertake it. The
issues in Amgen were not novel; in a similar case from 1884,142 the
Supreme Court considered whether a patentee who was the first to
produce a synthetic version of a natural dye was entitled to claim all
artificial versions of that dye, whether produced by the patentee's
process or not.143 The Supreme Court laid out the policy question
quite clearly: was the patentee entitled to claim the artificial dye, no
matter by what process it was made?'" For the Supreme Court, the
answer was no.145 To do so would mean granting the patentee a claim
"wider in its scope than the original actual invention." 46
In reaching this result, the Court explored a number of
alternative approaches: claim construction, lack of disclosure, and
the product-by-process doctrine.147 The Court did not find it
necessary to select which doctrinal framework most precisely
disposed of the case; instead, it concluded that no matter how the
case was viewed, patentability and infringement could not both be
sustained.148 The doctrinal vehicle was less important than the policy
of limiting the patentee to what it had actually invented. Likewise, in
a 1928 case, Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co.,149 the
139. See id. at 1337.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, Ill U.S. 293 (1884).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 312-13.
146. Id. at 313.
147. Id. at 311-12.
148. Id. at 313.
149. 277 U.S. 245 (1928).
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Supreme Court considered a patent for a starch-based glue that could
act as a substitute for the animal-based glues then used for furniture
manufacturing."' Like the patentee in Amgen, the patentee in
Holland Furniture broadly claimed all starch glues with the same
general composition and the same functional activity."' The Court
held that where a patentee had disclosed only a particular
composition that would perform the claimed function, the patent
law's disclosure statute did not entitle the patentee to claim all
similar compositions having the same function.152 Such a claim
would unacceptably preclude other inventors from developing
superior starch glues, and would thereby "extend the monopoly
beyond the invention.""
That perspective is absent from the decision in Amgen, though in
that respect, the case is no different than most Federal Circuit
jurisprudence. Following the model of conceptual differentiation, the
analysis was atomized into isolated components, each resolved
according to formal doctrines. For the court, arguments falling in the
interstices between doctrines were not to be considered; rather, the
court should: "decid[e] the challenges to validity under each
requirement as presented to it by the accused infringer."' 54
Notwithstanding limiting statements in the specification, the court
held that there was no justification for limiting the claims to the
technology the patentee disclosed, because the claims themselves
were linguistically unambiguous.'" The written description inquiry
became less a question of whether the specification disclosed the
claimed subject matter, and more a question of whether the
specification used the same words found in the claims.'56 The
question of whether the patentee enabled other synthetic processes
was irrelevant to enablement because the claims were drafted as
150. Id.
151. Id. at 252.
152. See id. at 256-57.
153. Id. at 257.
154. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
155. Id. at 1325-29.
156. See id. at 1330-31.
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"product" claims for which only one method of making must be
disclosed.'17
The defect in such an atomized analysis is that the whole
becomes less than the sum of its parts. When the question of patent
scope is reduced to a series of isolated inquiries with yes or no
answers, information tends to be lost between the steps. For example,
in Amgen, there were reasonably strong arguments, based on the
prosecution history and written description, that the claims ought to
be limited to the technology disclosed by the patentee.18 Those
arguments did not prevail over the plain meaning of the claims,
which lacked such limitations.'" But that information thereafter
disappeared from the case, not being relevant to the questions of
infringement or validity as they were subsequently framed.'60
Likewise, the defendant in Amgen had persuaded the district
court that some of the patents at issue in the suit failed to satisfy the
written description and enablement requirements, although not by the
clear and convincing standard necessary to invalidate the patent.'6 '
But the information that the patents, in the words of the district court,
"barely" satisfied the disclosure requirements disappeared from the
case once the court held that the challenger's arguments did not meet
the clear and convincing standard.'62 I am not arguing for the
imposition of some supermajority requirement on every element of a
patentee's case. However, if patent law is to carry out a policy of
balancing incentives between earlier and later inventors (not to
mention the public), a system of disaggregated and binary inquiries
does not seem well suited to the task. If, for example, we were to
attach some numerical rating to the strength of the patentee's case, it
seems odd that in a case where the patent is only 40 percent
nonobvious, 40 percent described, 40 percent enabled, and 51
157. See id at 1335.
158. See id. at 1325-26. The examiner had stated that the specification did not enable forms
of EPO expression technology beyond the exogenous DNA technology known at the time, and
the written description stated that the claimed invention was uniquely characterized by expression
from exogenous DNA sequences. Id. The defendant's product was not the product of exogenous
DNA expression. Id.
159. See id. at 1328.
160. See id. at 1337.
161. See id. at 1331; Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69, 164
(D. Mass. 2001) (finding patent in suit insufficiently enabled, but only by a preponderance of the
evidence).
162. See Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1337.
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percent infringed, the rights of the patentee are precisely the same as
those of a patentee whose case is overwhelming.'
There are certainly examples where the Federal Circuit has
taken a more nuanced approach to the problem of later-developed
technology and a more active policy role in setting the balance
between earlier and later inventors. For example, the court relied on
such an interpretive approach in Plant Genetic Systems, N. V v.
DeKalb Genetics Corp." Unlike Amgen, where the court refused to
read into the claims a limitation that would restrict the claims to the
technology enabled at the time of filing, the Plant Genetic Systems
court interpreted the claim to be restricted to the technology enabled
at the time of filing, despite the lack of an explicit limitation in the
claim.' 5
Still, even where the court has consciously embraced a policy
role in the question of patent scope, the court gravitates towards
formalist solutions. In Chiron v. Genentech,'6 6 the court was again
faced with the problem of a patentee's entitlement to exclude later-
developed technology. In contrast to Plant Genetic Systems, the
Chiron court eschewed an interpretive approach in favor of erecting
more formal and binary categories. The question of entitlement to
later-developed technology would be decided not as a matter of
individualized interpretation, but instead as a question of whether the
later-developed technology should be classified as "nascent" at the
time the application was filed.'67
163. I am assuming in this example that the threshold of clear and convincing evidence
needed to invalidate an issued patent corresponds to something like 60 percent certainty, if we
take a preponderance of the evidence to be greater than 50 percent certainty.
164. 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
165. The court held that a claim reciting plants "susceptible to infection and transformation by
Agrobacterium" was limited to plants that could be transformed by Agrobacterium at the time the
application was filed-namely, dicots. Id. at 1338, 1346. Although transformation of monocot
plants was possible by the time the patent was asserted, the claim was interpreted not to reach
monocot plants, notwithstanding the lack of an explicit dicot limitation. See id. at 1345. One view
of the difference between Plant Genetic Systems and Amgen is that in Plant Genetic Systems, the
examiner required an explicit limitation of the claim to the technology enabled by the patentee.
See id. at 1345-46. In Amgen, the examiner's similar view appeared only in the prosecution
history, and therefore disappeared from consideration because there was no claim language to
which that restriction could clearly be attached. See Amgen, 313 F.3d at 1326-27.
166. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
167. See id. at 1254. Judge Bryson endorsed the interpretive approach in his concurrence. See
id. at 1263 (Bryson, J., concurring).
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The court's preference (or at least the preference of some of its
judges) for the formal mechanisms of conceptual separation and
statutory fidelity inherited from the CCPA extends beyond questions
of later-arising technology. SmithKline v. Apotex,'68 a pharmaceutical
case, illustrates this trend.
SmithKline presented a knotty dilemma. The patentee held a
patent claiming a particular hemihydrate crystalline form of the
antidepressant paroxetine.'69 According to the patentee, once that
crystalline form had been synthesized and widespread in the
environment, it inevitably would seed the conversion of other forms
of paroxetine into the patented form." Thus, any attempt by the
defendant to produce non-infringing paroxetine would unavoidably
lead to production of at least trace amounts of the infringing
crystalline form."'
None of the judges considering the case were inclined to let the
patentee prevail on this theory. The interesting question was, on what
grounds could it be denied? The district court, Judge Posner sitting
by designation as a trial judge, reasoned that the defendant "should
enjoy the right to practice the prior art" by manufacturing the old
composition.172 The district court therefore proposed several
alternative resolutions to the problem."' Although the claim simply
recited "crystalline paroxetine hydrochloride hemihydrate" without
any limitation on quantity, Judge Posner construed the claim to
exclude compositions containing only trace amounts of the patented
crystalline form.'74 Alternatively, if the claim were not construed to
exclude mere traces of the patented form, the accused infringer
should be entitled to an equitable defense on the grounds that the
patentee's own conduct-seeding the world with his crystalline
form-had made noninfringement impossible."' Finally, because a
potential infringer could not determine whether his composition
168. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
169. Id. at 1334-35.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 1335-36 (discussing patentee's "seeding" or "disappearing polymorph"
theory).
172. Id. at 1331, 1336.
173. Id. at 1335.
174. Id. at 1336.
175. Id. at 1342.
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contained trace amounts of the patented form or not, the claim would
be indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112 if it were construed to cover
compositions including only trace amounts of the hemihydrate
crystalline form.'7 6
On appeal, Judge Gajarsa viewed the problem as a failure of the
public notice function of patents, arguing in a concurrence that
"[e]ffective notice is impossible if a natural physical process can
convert a noninfringing product into an infringing one.""' In his
view, a patent claim drawn broadly enough to cover subject matter
that spreads and reproduces was unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101,
and was therefore invalid."'
Judge Rader, writing for the majority, would have none of either
position. Contrary to the district court's inclination, for Judge Rader
policy concerns could have no place in the process of claim
construction, which was solely a question of linguistic
interpretation."' According to Judge Rader, "[c]laim construction. . .
is not a policy-driven inquiry. . . . [I]t is a contextual interpretation of
language. The scope of patent claims can neither be broadened nor
narrowed based on abstract policy considerations regarding the effect
of a particular claim meaning."'" Similarly (but contrary to the
Supreme Court's suggestion in Holland Furniture'"), the district
court's concern that a potential infringer could not determine if she
was infringing the patent was not a concern under the definiteness
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112; all that mattered for § 112 was that
the claim language was clear and unambiguous on its face. 8 2 Neither
was it relevant that the accused infringer sought to practice the prior
art. As the court had previously made clear, the conceptual
separation between infringement and anticipation meant that
"practicing the prior art" was not a defense to infringement.'" For the
176. Id. at 1340.
177. Id. at 1359 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
178. See id. at 1361 (Gajarsa, J., concurring).
179. See id. at 1339.
180. Id.
181. See supra notes 148-52.
182. See SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1340-41.
183. See Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[T]here is no 'practicing the prior art' defense to literal infringement."). If the
infringer is practicing the prior art, and the claim is construed to cover that prior art, then the
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majority, Judge Gajarsa's solution based on 35 U.S.C. § 101 also ran
afoul of the principles of conceptual differentiation and statutory
textualism. To resolve the problem via the subject matter
requirement would impermissibly mingle 35 U.S.C. § 101 with other
doctrines of patent law, such as claim scope and anticipation.'84
Instead, the majority's resolution depended on imposing a new
formal and binary stamp upon the law of anticipation.8 5 Judge Rader
brushed aside long-standing precedent which had suggested that
trace or accidental production of a compound in the prior art does not
anticipate a claim. Rejecting this approach in favor of an absolute
rule, the court held that production of even trace quantities of the
claimed hemihydrate compound would anticipate the claim, even if
the existence of the hemihydrate form was unknown at the time.'8 6
Therefore, because trace amounts of the claimed compound might
have existed before the patentee first discovered it, the claim was
invalid as inherently anticipated by the prior art.'
Thus, the Federal Circuit's "controlled delegation" strategy
parallels the approach developed by the common law courts: reduce
doctrines to discrete and binary inquiries and rely primarily on the
litigants to determine which doctrines will be available for the
exercise of control on appeal. This approach does permit the court to
exercise policy choices, as Judge Rader did in SmithKline. But it is
not necessary for the court to adopt this approach to exercise policy
claim ought to be invalid for lack of novelty under § 102. But the categorization of "practicing the
prior art" as a question of novelty rather than of infringement is not simply a matter of form, due
to the elevated standard of proof for patent invalidity. The patentee might establish infringement
by showing via a preponderance of the evidence that the accused subject matter has the properties
recited by the claim. But if the infringer could establish that the prior art met the claim limitations
only by a preponderance of the evidence, and not by clear and convincing evidence, the patentee
would prevail on novelty as well.
184. See SmithKline, 403 F.3d at 1342 (stating that "the concurrence confuses patent
eligibility under § 101 with patentability under other provisions in the Patent Act, such as 35
U.S.C. § 102," and "[t]he scope of the claims is not relevant to subject matter eligibility").
185. See id. at 1341-46.
186. See id. at 1344-45.
187. The court decided that even the first attempts to make the anhydrate must necessarily
have yielded trace quantities of the hemihydrate. See id. at 1343-44. The court distinguished In re
Seaborg as a case in which there was "no positive evidence" that the claimed isotope was
inherently produced in the prior art, in contrast to the present case where production was
"undisputed." Id. at 1346. Yet the "undisputed" evidence consisted largely of the patentee's
inability to disprove the district court's speculation that the hemihydrate "may have existed" since
the 1970s and that "it may also be possible" for the anhydrate to coexist with low levels of the
hemihydrate without further conversion. Id. at 1345.
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choices. Cloaking the exercise of policy preferences in the guise of
statutory textualism may have been necessary to provide legitimacy
for the CCPA's control over the Patent Office, but the Federal
Circuit has no need to abstain from traditional common law
development. Moreover, the use of binary statutory inquiries is not
the optimal instrument by which to exercise policy preferences.
First, such doctrines tend to be blunt instruments. For example,
in SmithKline, Judge Rader solved the dilemma by resorting to an
absolutist conception of the anticipation doctrine. Manipulating the
doctrine of anticipation may have solved the perceived problem in
SmithKline, but the creation of a new rigid and absolute rule of
inherency may have unforeseen consequences for other cases.
Addressing the problem directly yields a more narrowly tailored
solution, and one that is more intellectually forthright as well. Judge
Gajarsa contrasted these alternatives in SmithKline. Noting that
"something 'feels wrong' about holding an infringer liable for
inevitable, spontaneous infringement," he argued for the direct
approach of resolving the question under the subject matter doctrine
of 35 U.S.C. § 101:
We therefore face a choice. We can either address the issue
head-on and explain why an attempt to patent unpatentable
subject matter leads to so many apparent anomalies, or we
can try to contort the aspects of patent law raised by the
parties in order to avoid those anomalies. I believe that the
law is best served by adopting the straightforward
approach.'"
Moreover, as Judge Gajarsa's argument suggests, the particular
arguments framed by the litigants, tailored to suit each party's
interest in the case under appeal, may not be the ones best suited to
resolve the larger policy questions. This was not an obstacle for the
CCPA, whose nonchalance about the niceties of appellate review let
it reframe appeals from the Patent Office according to its own views
of the real issues at stake. Because the CCPA freely reframed
appeals, its insistence upon strong conceptual separation did not
preclude it from choosing the optimal doctrine to resolve a particular
case. But at the Federal Circuit, conceptual separation-coupled with
188. Id. at 1355 n.5.
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emphasis on the standard of review-may tend to make cases more
path-dependent. Outcomes will depend strongly on the doctrinal
framing of the issues by the parties and the standard of review
applicable to that doctrine, and on whether the particular judges
hearing the case view their role as merely choosing between the
parties' arguments (as in Amgen") or adopting a more active role in
exercising policy choices (as in SmithKline). Formalism may be
defended if it brings more certainty to patent law. But if idiosyncratic
choice among inflexible doctrines itself leads to unpredictability,
then formalism's primary advantage over more flexible doctrines is
lost.
IV. THE Loss TO PATENT LAW: A FAILURE OF INTEGRATION
A. Integrative Versus Reductionist Doctrines
The greatest loss in an atomized patent law, however, may not
be a loss of predictability. It may be that in the drive towards
reductionism and conceptual separation we have lost the ability to
integrate pre- and post-invention information in deciding the extent
of the patentee's rights. Consider the following statement by a
practicing attorney in the late 1950s on how courts decided what
scope should be accorded to a patent:
So you must, in deciding whether or not a patent is
infringed, make up your mind on the basis of the prior art
and what has happened in the market place, what the impact
of this patent has been, whether it has been a real advance,
and then decide what the scope is, based on how much it
advanced the art, and go on from there to interpret the
claims of the patent.1o
Of course, such an approach seems anything but predictable. Yet
it does have the advantage of integrating specific information about
the innovation process into the infringement inquiry. As Dan Burk
and Mark Lemley note, inquiries that integrate information about ex
post developments carry the insuperable advantage of hindsight;
while it is difficult to forecast the consequences of granting a patent
189. See supra notes 153-62.
190. Floyd H. Crews, Patent Claims and Infringement, in DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT
SYSTEM 128, 136 (William B. Ball ed., 1960).
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with a particular scope at the time of the grant, at the time of
infringement those consequences are clear.19' Thus, if we desire
optimal tailoring of patent law to the landscape of innovation, we
ought to favor integrative doctrines.
Unfortunately, integrative approaches seem to have all but
disappeared from patent law today. The CCPA, as Hogan so clearly
showed,'92 consciously eschewed integrative doctrines in considering
patentability because "[t]he business of the PTO is patentability, not
infringement." 93 The regional courts of appeals, whose experience
was shaped by patent enforcement rather than by patent procurement,
may have permitted integrated tendencies in their patentability
jurisprudence. But because the Federal Circuit adopted the CCPA's
patentability jurisprudence, any integrative tendencies the courts of
appeals may have embraced in their patentability jurisprudence were
discarded when the Federal Circuit adopted the CCPA's caselaw in
1982.
B. The Fate ofInfringement Law
Doctrines relating solely to patent infringement were generally
not within the purview of the CCPA's caselaw, and were therefore
not explicitly jettisoned by the Federal Circuit's adoption of CCPA
precedent. But the commitment to conceptual separation so deeply
rooted in the law of patentability would inevitably have permeated
the Federal Circuit's developing law of infringement as well. Almost
by definition, integrative doctrines violate the principle of conceptual
separation. Starting with a well-developed law of patentability that
was strictly isolated from enforcement concerns, it is not surprising
that the Federal Circuit's law of infringement has tended to limit or
eliminate integrative aspects in the law of patent infringement.
There are three doctrines in the law of infringement that are
potentially integrative: (1) the reverse doctrine of equivalents,
because it shields an accused infringer who has radically altered the
principle of the invention despite remaining within the literal bounds
of the claims; (2) the doctrine of equivalents, because it takes into
191. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1743, 1781-82 (2009) [hereinafter Fence Posts].
192. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
193. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 607 (1977).
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account the magnitude of the differences between the claimed
inventor and the accused subject matter; and (3) claim construction,
because the interpretation of the claim defines the extent of the
patentee's rights. 19 4
Of these doctrines of infringement, the reverse doctrine of
equivalents is, in theory, the doctrine with the most potential to
integrate information about disclosure, the prior art, and the
technological context of the alleged infringement.' However, since
its founding, the Federal Circuit has viewed the reverse doctrine of
equivalents with exceeding skepticism, describing it as a defense
"rarely invoked and virtually never sustained."l96
With respect to the ordinary doctrine of equivalents, the court's
general aversion to the doctrine of equivalents has limited any
integrative role the doctrine might play. But dedication to conceptual
separation has also likely discouraged the use of the doctrine of
equivalents as an integrative device. For example, in a case early in
the court's history, Judge Newman took into consideration the pace
and direction of subsequent technological development in a
"complex and rapidly-evolving"" field to find non-infringement of a
means-plus-function claim, taking into account the "entirety of the
technology embodied in the accused devices."' The court found that
"the total of the technological changes beyond what the inventors
disclosed transcends the equitable limits" of 35 U.S.C. § 112, and
"propels the accused devices beyond a just scope of the . . .
claims."'9 9 Professor Dreyfuss, quite rightly, criticized the court for
194. The law of remedies may in some instances play an integrative role. If the claimed
invention is only a trivial advance over the prior art, then the patentee's entitlement to a
reasonable royalty may be limited if the infringer could readily have adopted a non-infringing
alternative. But this is not the case if the patentee can demonstrate lost profits, in which case the
patentee is entitled to recover for all sales lost on account of the infringement-even sales of
products not embodying the patented invention. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d
1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). The new flexibility given to courts in granting injunctions under
eBay v. MercExchange may in the future allow courts to more closely calibrate equitable relief to
the context of the case. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
195. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 11, at 1657-58.
196. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2009). The DePuy court at least reversed the district court's imposition of a $10 million sanction
against the defendant for asserting the defense. See id. at 1339.
197. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
198. Id. at 1570.
199. Id. at 1571.
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"manag[ing] to muddy the waters on the significance of being first in
a field, the application of means expressions to new technologies,
and both the doctrine of equivalents and the reverse doctrine of
equivalents." 20 0 Those criticisms are entirely correct, but they
illustrate the tension between the doctrinal clarity we may seek in
patent law, and the law's ability to make flexible and integrated
policy judgments in individual cases.
C. Claim Construction as an Integrative Doctrine
1. Prospective and Retrospective Scope
This leaves claim construction. Claim interpretation is in some
respects the ideal vehicle for both integration and the exercise of
judicial policy control. As Craig Nard has suggested (and Burk and
Lemley have reiterated) claim construction-if carried out with the
conscious goal of tailoring patent scope-permits the courts to
exercise retrospective calibrations of patent scope in response to the
course of innovation since the patent was granted.2 0' And from a
doctrinal perspective, claim construction has other advantages as
well. Claim construction is individualized justice. Because
interpretation of each claim is largely sui generis, a determination of
scope in one case has few implications for other cases.202 Moreover,
at least under the current claim construction regime, claim
construction is reviewed de novo by the Federal Circuit.203 Though
criticisms of this regime are legion, de novo review essentially gives
the court the flexibility the CCPA once enjoyed, allowing it to adjust
determinations on appeal without being constrained by a deferential
standard of review or the idiosyncratic development of facts at the
trial below.
Claim construction has not developed into a general integrative
doctrine, though there are individual cases in which it has performed
200. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1989).
201. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38-40
(1999).
202. Contrast this approach with cases like SmithKline, which enunciated a rule of
anticipation with potentially far-reaching consequences in response to the demands of that case.
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
203. Id. at 1336.
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this function.20 4 In part, this failure is a direct result of the drive
towards conceptual differentiation. If patent law is to be conceived as
a series of separate, binary inquiries, then it is necessary that the
boundaries of the claim be precise so that each inquiry may be
structured as a question of inclusion or exclusion of subject matter
from the scope of the claim. As a result, rather than being integrative,
claim construction has become more formalistic. While the Federal
Circuit has rejected rigid procedures for the process of claim
construction,205 the court continues to focus solely on the linguistic
sense of the claim, prizing certainty above all other goals. The court
has made clear that claim interpretation is intellectually divorced
from validity or infringement concerns,2 0 6 and so long as that
separation remains, claim construction cannot serve an integrative
role.
2. Claim as Contract
The insistence that claim construction be a separate (and perhaps
formalistic) issue derives clearly from a basic desire for certainty and
predictability in ascertaining the boundaries of a patentee's rights.
Yet in some sense, the modem emphasis on certain and predictable
boundaries is a legacy of the CCPA as well. The modem language of
patent claims tends to be the language of property.207 The conception
of patents as property justifies the demand that the peripheral claim
define the boundaries of the patentee's right to exclude; the
boundaries of a patent define the patentee's rights to exclude as
precisely as the boundaries of real property define the landowner's
right to exclude. 208 But historically, another conception of patents has
been prominent in U.S. patent law: patent as contract. In this
conception, the patent represents a contract between the government
and the inventor: the inventor discloses the invention in exchange for
the grant of a limited monopoly term.209 Though the patent right itself
204. See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
205. In Phillips v. A WH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), the court
declined to mandate a defined procedure or hierarchy for claim construction.
206. See supra text accompanying note 180.
207. See, e.g., Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
1998) ("[T]he resulting claim interpretation must, in the end, accord with the words chosen by the
patentee to stake out the boundary of the claimed property.").
208. See BURK & LEMLEY, PATENT CRISIS, supra note 11, at 74-75.
209. See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1832).
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was recognized a species of property early in the history of American
law,210 the obligations of both the inventor (in securing the patent)
and the government (in enforcing the patent) were considered
fundamentally contractual in nature.21 1
Why is the characterization of patents as property or contract
significant for claim interpretation? The question arose when the
Federal Circuit debated en banc the standard of review for district
court claim construction in Markman v. Westview Instruments; those
judges who would have classified claim construction as a question of
fact bolstered their argument by analogizing patents to contracts.212
But the classification of claim construction as law or fact is perhaps
the least significant consequence of the contract analogy. A contract
analogy suggests a very different framework of claim
interpretation-one in which the object of interpretation is not to
establish the meaning of words in the abstract, or even the words in
the context of the contract, but to effectuate the exchange
contemplated by the parties in light of subsequent events. In
Markman, the majority opinion perhaps rightly rejected the notion
that claim interpretation requires an inquiry into the intent of the
patentee or of the Patent Office, just as we would inquire into the
intent of parties to a contract.2 13 But it does not follow that the
purposive orientation of contract interpretation should be rejected as
well.
If we consider seriously the notion of patent as contract, then it
becomes irresistible at this point to draw an analogy with relational
contract theory. One aspect of relational theory, particularly
regarding contracts governing a continuing course of conduct,
espouses a view of contract as an ongoing relationship "which may
require periodic intervention . . . by . . . judges, given changing
210. See generally Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About
Patents? Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953
(2007).
211. William Robinson, whose 1890 treatise was perhaps the most influential work on
American patent law ever written, went so far as to declare that patent rights and duties simply
constituted "one branch of the Law of Contracts." 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF
PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 41 (1890).
212. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997-98 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
(Mayer, J., concurring); id. at 1000-01 (Newman, J., dissenting).
213. See id. at 985-86.
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circumstances, expectations, and interests."2 14 Though courts lack the
expertise of contracting parties, a court considering a dispute ex post
has the advantage of information the parties lacked at the time of
contract formation.2 15 Therefore, rather than solely seeking to
effectuate the parties' intent at the time of contract formation, a court
ought to be willing to adjust a contract in light of unforeseen
circumstances.2 16
This conception very much evokes Burk and Lemley's
conception of judicial supervision, in which judges make
retrospective and industry-specific determinations in light of the
current technological landscape, rather than rely upon a scope fixed
at patent issuance.217 Contract theorists debate whether the
retrospective vantage point of the judge-compared to the
prospective vantage point of the parties--compensates for the
judge's presumed unfamiliarity vis-Ai-vis the parties with the subject
matter of the contract.2 18 These debates seem to parallel the question
in patent law of whether appellate judges' retrospective vantage
point provides them with superior decision-making ability, as
compared to the prospective but (allegedly) expert judgment of the
Patent Office.2 19
Remarkably, in the period just prior to the creation of the
Federal Circuit, at least some of the regional courts of appeals
continued to adhere to the patent-as-contract theory as the guiding
principle of interpretation.22 0 Thus, as late as 1980, the Fifth Circuit
could state that "[a] patent is to be construed as a contract with the
214. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 1112 (4th ed. 2008).
215. See Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under
Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 26 (1987) (arguing that hindsight advantages judges
over parties).
216. See id. at 12-13.
217. See Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 191, at 1781-82.
218. See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
847, 858-59 (2000) (summarizing and criticizing ex post information theory).
219. See Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 191, at 1781-82. The arguments for
expertise carry less weight in the patent context than in contract. The parties to a contract might
be assumed to reach optimal terms. But in patent law, there is no necessary correlation between
the current value of a patent and the incentive that was necessary or optimal to foster
development of the invention. Nor is there any necessary correlation between the deadweight loss
from monopoly pricing and the value gained by society from development or disclosure of the
invention. It is therefore difficult to argue that patent scope decisions need be expertly calibrated
to optimize ex ante incentives.
220. See, e.g., Stearns v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 669 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1982).
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intent of the parties as the lodestar. It is the real invention claimed
and granted protection which we seek to determine." 221' The Ninth
Circuit voiced similar sentiments in 1978.222 The use of the patent-as-
contract interpretive model by the regional courts of appeals may
very well have reflected a relational outlook derived from their
retrospective view of patent litigation. However, this was clearly not
the case with the CCPA. The CCPA was consistent in its views that a
patent was nothing more than a grant bound firmly to statute; indeed,
according to the court, the contract analogy was only a "popular
myth."223 As Judge Rich explained:
The examiner's notion about the United States granting a
contract is inapt. The Government grants only a right to
exclude. There is no other agreement. While a patent has
often been likened to a contract on the theory that it is
issued in exchange for the disclosure of the invention (the
"consideration"), the analogy is inexact. A patent is a
statutory right. It is granted to "Whoever" fulfills the
[statutory] conditions [of patentability] . . . unless fraud has
been committed.22 4
Given that heritage, it is unsurprising that the Federal Circuit
rejected the contractual analogy in Markman. But that rejection was
not significant because of what it might imply about whether judges
or juries should interpret patent claims. It was significant because it
entailed the rejection of a relational or retrospective perspective in
the claim construction process. Indeed, in Markman, Judge Archer
explained that patents could not be regarded as contracts because
they entailed no further obligations: "A patent, however, is not a
contract. Contracts are executory in nature-they contain promises
221. Id. at 1098 (citing Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928, 933 (5th Cir.
1973)).
222. See Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d 772, 776 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The starting
point is the rule that patent claims should be construed liberally to uphold the patent's validity
rather than to destroy the inventor's right to protect the substance of his invention. . . .
Interpreting patent claims calls for more than application of a rigid literalism. The patent is a
contract between the government and the patentee.").
223. Krantz v. Olin, 356 F.2d 1016, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
224. In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516, 518 n.3 (C.C.P.A. 1980); see also In re Yardley, 493 F.2d
1389, 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1974) ("The Commissioner's argument based on the 'failure of
consideration' concept borrowed from the law of private contracts is inappropriate here. A patent
is not a contract.").
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that must be performed. Once a patent is issued, any purported
exchange of promises between the applicant and the Patent and
Trademark Office (Patent Office) has been fully executed." 225 Thus
the legacy of the CCPA doomed the conception of patent-as-contract,
and the flexible model of patent enforcement as well.
CONCLUSION: THE HERITAGE OF PATENT LAW
The CCPA bequeathed to us the constitution of modem patent
law. Its heritage was a rich and well-developed system of
patentability, admirable for its intellectual clarity and dedication to
coherence. But that body of law was also shaped by the unique
nature of the CCPA and fashioned by judges who only saw the patent
system ex ante. When the Federal Circuit adopted that body of law in
its first decision, it adopted not only the substantive law of
patentability but also the jurisprudential outlook and methodology
that the CCPA had developed in the years following the 1952 Patent
Act. That orientation may have served the CCPA well in its role as
overseer of the Patent Office, but it has not necessarily served the
very different needs of the Federal Circuit. Moreover, in adopting the
precedent of the CCPA, the Federal Circuit was also-knowingly or
not-discarding the doctrine of those courts whose ex post
perspective had been shaped by their experience in patent litigation.
The Federal Circuit has for the most part succeeded in its mission to
bring uniformity and coherence to patent law, thanks largely to its
heritage from the CCPA. Its challenge now is to reclaim the
pragmatic and integrative doctrines that have been the heritage of
patent law as well.
225. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 985 n.14 (Fed Cir. 1995) (citation
omitted).
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